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Yudin: Reply to Comments

I am grateful to all commentators for the opportunity to expand on several
important points. I will try to summarize them by putting forward five propositions,
addressing the issues from the origins of the current condition in Russia to the
trajectory of its development and possible strategies and outlooks for the future.
1. In Russia, neoliberalism won over democracy under Putin. After the fall of the
Soviet Union, theorists of modernization were certain that liberal democracy was the
only game left in town, and therefore to be implemented in Russia. However, the
uneasiness of the alliance between democracy and liberalism was never a concern.
It was assumed that one of them automatically entails another, and for a long period
market reforms and democratization were literally used as synonyms.
As a result, the liberal governments of the early 1990s strongly prioritized
economic reforms following the neoliberal templates. Despite the initial enthusiasm
about political participation after the 1991 revolution, very little attention was paid to
developing the institutions of self-government. Gradually, the neoliberal intellectuals
grew increasingly resentful to popular rule: the first elections brought disappointing
outcomes to the liberal parties, as the masses protested by voting for the extreme
right-wing parties like the Communist Party and the Liberal-Democratic Party. After
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s LDPR surprisingly won the first Russian parliamentary
elections in 1993, the liberal philosopher Yuri Karyakin famously exclaimed “Russia,
you lost your f**g mind”, signaling a deep disenchantment with democracy among
the Russian liberals.
In this emerging conflict between democracy and liberalism, Boris Yeltsin was
ambiguous: while promoting market reforms, he consistently declined to introduce
censorship in spite of demands from the liberals, deliberately protected political
plurality and opposition, and underscored the value of federalism. With Putin, those
restraints ended. Putin learned to navigate the free market economy in SaintPetersburg of the 1990s (as Artemy rightly points out, his gangster background and
close friendships with the heads of criminal gangs are more consequential than his
KGB years) and became its staunch defender after his ascendance to the
presidency. At the same time, he saw self-government and pluralism as a potential
source of chaos and a hindrance to the functioning of the free market, which resulted
in the removal of the democratic elements in the system. The economic neoliberals
like Elvira Nabiullina or Sergei Kirienko retained and solidified their status within
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Putin’s regime, while political liberals like Boris Nemtsov who were not ready to give
up on democracy were kicked out of the system, persecuted, and destroyed.
To answer Albena’s question, radical neoliberalism took off in Russia in the
2000s1. It brought about the rise of true oligarchy: according to the Forbes ratings,
Russia had 112 billionaires before the war, and remains one of the global leaders
with 78 billionaires despite the war. The lists of Russian billionaires consist chiefly of
two groups: the oligarchs from the nineties who grew much richer under Putin (like
Abramovich, Potanin, Deripaska, or Fridman) and Putin’s close friends who got their
fortunes through their proximity to him (like Timchenko, Rotenberg, Miller, or
Kovalchuk).
More importantly, however, the logic of homo oeconomicus got fully
entrenched in Russia in the 2000s. While there is certainly a correlation between
Putin’s legitimacy and the rise of consumption opportunities for the majority of
Russians, it takes a legitimation turn to make people value material well-being only
and give up completely on political freedom, justice, or equality. The installation of a
neoliberal subjectivity was a prerequisite for that.
The Bonapartist, or plebiscitarian, regime described by Artemy was a natural
outcome of popular passivity and cynicism. Paul Passavant rightly points out that
firm belief in brute force creates a vacuum of legitimacy. However, Bonapartism
partly compensates for it by introducing a monarchical presidency, the only political
institution enjoying legitimacy. Relying on the numbers gained through plebiscites,
the president threatens the elites, the bureaucracy and the dissociated masses with
the power of the people supposedly accumulated behind him. In a society with
broken solidarity, there is no way to verify these claims.

2. With the outbreak of the war, the Russian political regime turned fascist but failed
to create a fascist society. The radical imposition of deep egotism and individualism
inevitably contributes to the rise of resentful masses susceptible to a fascist
takeover, as Paul Apostolidis rightly reminds us. The Russian political regime in 2022

As Elisabeth Schimpfössl correctly points out, “while Russianists usually regard the
1990s as the peak of neoliberal policies, from a comparative perspective [the 2000s
were] outstanding in neoliberal ambition”. See: E. Schimpfössl. Rich Russians: From
Oligarchs to Bourgeoisie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. P. 26.
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underwent a fascist turn2, building a strong identity between the leader, the state,
and the people. This identity is performed through militarization, the rise of violence
both domestically and outwards, and the promotion of a fascist aesthetic. The war is
presented as a self-assertion of the nation resolved to retake dominance through
struggle.
The fascist regime is not necessarily accompanied by a fascist society.
Contrary to what David Strecker suggests, there is very little evidence of the rising
support for Putin after the invasion. Opinion polls are not only misleading but
deliberately orchestrated as a weapon by the Kremlin3, while all other studies
suggest that what is going on can instead be described as “defensive consolidation”,
to borrow the term invented by Jeremy Morris4.
The discrepancy between the new condition of the regime and the congealed
society implies that there may be limits for mobilization. The Kremlin is wary of
rapidly repoliticizing society after the decades of forced depoliticization. On the other
hand, the inherent anarchist tendencies within Russian society tend to wreck some
of the mobilization strategies. In other words, indifference prevails over
bloodthirstiness in Russia at this point. However, the aggressive groups that followed
the fascist turn are vocal enough to dominate the agenda and instill fear within
society.
3. Present-day Russia is an extreme case of neoliberalism representing a dangerous
model for societies on a similar trajectory. Even if, as Artemy Magun suggests, the
Russian state produces a negation of Western capitalism, it does so through
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Ilya Budraitskis. Putinism: A New Form of Fascism? Spectre. 2022. Iss. 6.

See: Greg Yudin. Do Russians Support Putin? Journal of Democracy. 2022. 33 (3):
31-37
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Jeremy Morris. Russians in Wartime and Defensive Consolidation. Current History.
2022. 121 (837): 258-263.
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radically affirming the neoliberal principle as Russian leadership understands it5.
American foreign policy is perceived as the brute imposition of force, with rules being
merely a hypocritical disguise for violence. And the Russian response to it is not to
challenge the principle but to insist forcefully: We want to do the same. We want to
kill, brutalize, rape, and subjugate just like you Americans do, because who are you
to be the only ones to enjoy this right of force? In this feeling of deep resentment,
there is indeed a dangerous convergence between Vladimir Putin and large groups
of the Russian population, which contains a potential for popular passivity to turn into
an open aggression.
While I am no expert in post-Soviet countries (and I even doubt this label is
analytically useful), I share Albena’s concern that Russian-style neoliberal capitalism
is a dangerous template for the European societies. If one adopts the language of
the “varieties of capitalism” literature, Russia has set out on the Anglo-Saxon path,
rather than a Nordic/Japanese one. As many commentators have rightly pointed out,
what keeps capitalism from sliding into a cutthroat competition driven by the winnertakes-all mentality are not human rights but basic solidarity and safety nets
developed in the society. Inasmuch as those balances are eroding in Europe, Russia
becomes a tempting model for the entrepreneurs. It is no coincidence that European
big capital is reluctant to leave Russia after the outbreak of the war. At the same
time, the “party of resentment” has many followers far beyond Russia: the
experience of humiliation in neoliberal settings makes for nihilist, vengeful, and
cynical attitudes to politics, which explains the limited but still visible popularity of
Putin in both the Global South and Global North.
4. Russia is now undergoing a massive transformation, which will be shaped by
social-democratic demands. The need for solidarity, mutual support, and selfgovernment is in fact reflected within Russian society, particularly among the
younger generations and the less affluent. Multiple studies, including my own,

“The turn from the liberalist to the total-authoritarian state occurs within the
framework of a single social order. With regard to the unity of this economic base, we
can say it is liberalism that ‘produces’ the total authoritarian state out of itself, as its
own consummation at a more advanced stage of development. The totalauthoritarian state brings with it the organization and theory of society that
correspond to the monopolistic stage of capitalism.” (Herbert Marcuse, “The Struggle
Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State”. In: Negations. Essays in
Critical Theory. London: MayFly Books. P. 13.)
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demonstrate that the Russian youth are not only significantly less supportive of
military aggression, but also cherish the hope for a more equal country6. Enzo
makes a crucial point about a possible change in Russia, which can only be attained
by activating popular power. The findings provide some grounds for optimism: there
is, indeed, a tangible demand for that in Russia. While there is a long way from
weakly articulated preferences to a collective action, a strong preference for a
Scandinavian type of society within Russia indicates the disaffection with aggressive
capitalism. It is also a sign of demand for popular sovereignty, rather than national
sovereignty, an alternative that David Strecker wisely emphasizes for the Ukrainian
case.
This war is in many ways a war to prevent these dreams from turning into
political projects, a war waged by the past aiming to suffocate the future in its cradle.
The eventual military defeat of Putin’s aggressive regime will likely result in a deep
disappointment with the mode of social organization and a search for a different
model. While this search will be most significantly shaped by specific outcomes on
the battlefield, it will still present an opportunity. This will be an opportunity not be
squandered with another round of pleas for human rights, the free market, and
negative liberty.
5. Major wars cannot be ignored, and the international Left needs to be proactive to
shape them and dictate their outcomes. Wars are radical manifestation of objective
contradictions that cannot be contained. As these contradictions accumulate in
contemporary neoliberal capitalism, wars are likely to become an inevitable
development. Recently, the Left has too often taken the “a plague on both your
houses” stance, searching for moral purity and running the risk of becoming
politically irrelevant. Taking sides in imperial wars is certainly not an option; however,
“imperial” is a framing that shouldn’t be taken for granted. Looking into the
contradictions at the origin of these wars can help reframe them, much in the way
Lenin called for turning imperial wars into civil wars and eliminating the real
contradictions.
The current war is not an outcome of some essential and inescapable
animosity between two empires, as conservative thinking suggests. The real
contradiction behind this war is the one inherent in Russian neoliberal capitalism that
See: Greg Yudin et al. How the New Generation Envisions the Future: Inequality
and Mobility. A Report for Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, 2019.
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projects the zero-sum logic onto international politics and perceives the land not
conquered as a threat. Rather than ignoring this contradiction, the task for the Left is
to reframe this war and contribute to defeating the logic of unchained capital.
Under current circumstances, the pressure to stop the war has a decent
chance of stripping Ukraine of the means to resist aggression. What the calls for
peace are yet to demonstrate is how they are going to stop Vladimir Putin.
I express my deep gratitude to the members of the Radical Critical Theory Circle for
their warm support in these difficult times and for making me feel that radical thinking
defeats darkness.
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